Scepsis
Scientifica,
Or, The Vanity of Dogmatizing
By
Joseph
Glanvill.
CONTENTS
AN ESSAY ON THE LIFE AND WORKS OF JOSEPH GLANVILL.
By
John Owen.
AN ADDRESS TO THE ROYAL SOCIETY.
Chap. I.
A general description of the state of primitive ignorance; by way of introduction.
Chap. II.
Our decay and ruins by the fall; particularly those of our intellectual powers.
Chap. III.
A general account of our ignorance of our own natures.
Chap. IV.
Some great instances of our ignorance discoursed of, (i) of things
within ourselves. The nature of the soul and its origin, glanced at and
passed by: (1) its union with the body is unconceivable: so (2) is its
moving the body, considered either in the way of Sir K. Digby,
Descartes, or Dr. H. More, and the Platonists. (3) the manner of
direction of the spirits, as unexplicable.
Chap. V.
(4) we can give no account of the manner of Sensation.
Chap. VI.
The nature of the memory unaccountable. 'Tis considered particularly
according to the Aristotelian, Cartesian, Digbean and Hobbian
hypothesis.
Chap. VII.
How our bodies are formed unexplicable. The plastic signifies nothing:
the formation of plants, and animals unknown, in their principle.
Mechanism solves it not. A new way profounded, which also fails of
satisfaction. (2.) No account is yet given how the parts of matter are
united. Some consideration on Descartes his hy pothesis, it fails of
solution. (3.) The question is unanswerable, whether matter be
compounded of divisibles, or indivisibles.
Chap. VII.
Difficulties about the motion of a wheel, which admit of no solution.
Chap. IX.
Men's backwardness to acknowledge their own ignorance and error, though
ready to find them in others. The (i) cause of the shortness of our
knowledge, viz. The depth of verity discoursed of, as of its admixtion
in mens opinions with falsehood, and the connexion of truths, and their
mutual dependence: a second reason of the shortness of our knowledge,
viz. Because we can perceive nothing but by proportion to our senses.
Chap. X.
A third reason of our ignorance and error, viz. The impostures and
deceits of our senses. The way to rectify these misinformations
propounded. Descartes his method the only way to science. The
difficulty of exact performance.
Chap. XI.
Two instances of sensitive decefition. (1) of the quiescence of the
Earth. Sense is the great inducement to its belief; its testimony
deserves no credit in this case, though it do move, sense would present
it as immoveable. The sun to sense is as much devoid of motion as the
Earth. The cases wherein motion is insensible, applied to the Earth's
motion. The unwieldiness of its bulk is no argument of its immobility.
Chap. XII.
Another instance of the deceptions of our senses: which is of
translating the idea of our passions to things without us. Properly and
formally heat is not in the fire, but is an expression of our
sentiment. Yet in propriety of speech the senses themselves are never
deceived, but only administer an occasion of deceit to the
understanding: proved by reason, and the authority of St. Austin.
Chap. XIII.
A fourth reason of our ignorance and error, viz. The fallacy of our
imaginations; an account of the nature of that faculty; instances of
its deceptions; spirits are not in a place; intellection, volition,
decrees, &c. cannot properly be ascribed to God. It is not reason
that opposeth faith, but fancy: the interest which imagination hath in
many of our opinions, in that it impresses a persuasion without
evidence.
Chap. XIV.
A fifth reason, the precipitancy of our understandings; the reason of
it. The most close engagement of our minds requisite to the finding of
truth; the difficulties of the performance of it. Two instances of our
precipitating; as the concluding things impossible, which to nature are
not so; and the joining causes with irrelative effects.
Chap. XV.
The sixth reason discoursed of, viz. the interest which our affections
have in our dijudications. The cause why our affections mislead us:
several branches of this mentioned; and the first, viz. constitutional
inclination largely insisted on.
Chap. XVI.
A second thing whereby our affections in-gage us in error; is the
prejudice of custom and education. A third, interest. The fourth, love
to our own productions.
Chap. XVII.
5. Our affections are enaged by our reverence to antiquity and
authority. This hath been a great hinderer of theorical improvements,
and it hath been an advantage to the mathematics, and mechanic's arts,
that it hath no place in them. Our mistake of antiquity. The
unreasonableness of that kind of pedantic adoration. Hence the vanity
of affecting impertinent quotations. The pedantry on't is derided; the
little improvement of science through its successive derivations, end
whence that hath happened.
Chap. XVIII.
REFLECTIONS ON THE PERIPATETIC PHOLOSOPHY
The generality of its reception, no argument of its deserts; the first
charge against that philosophy; that it is merely verbal. Materia prima
in that philisophy signifies nothing. A parallel drawn between it and
imaginary space: this latter pleads more for its reality. Their form also is a mere word, and potentia Materiae insignificant. Privation no principle. An essay to detect Peripatetic verbosity, by translating some definitions.
Chap. XIX.
2. Peripatetic philosophy is litigious; it hath no setled constant
signification of words; the inconveniences hereof. Aristotle intended
the cherishing controversies; proved by his own double testimony. Some
of his impertinent arguings instanced in. Disputes retard, and are
injurious to knowledge. Peripatetics are most exercised in the
controversal parts of philosophy, and know little of the practical and
experimental. A touch at school-divinity.
Chap. XX.
3. It gives no account of the phenomena; those that are remoter, it
attempts not. It speaks nothing pertinent in the most ordinary: its
circular, and general way of solution. It resolves all things into
occult qualities. The absurdity of the Aristotelian hypothesis of the
heavens. The galaxy is no meteor: the heavens are corruptible. Comets
are above the moon. The sphere of fire derided. Aristotle convicted of
several other false assertions.
Chap. XXII.
(5.) The Aristotelian philosophy inconsistent with divinity; and (6.) With itself. The conclusion of the reflections.
Chap. XXIII.
It's queried whether there be any science in the sense of the
dogmatists: (1.) We cannot know anything to be the cause of another,
but from its attending it; and this way is not infallible; declared by
instances, especially from the philosophy of Descartes. All things are
mixed; and 'tis difficult to assign each cause its distinct effects.
(2.) There's no demonstration but where the contrary is impossible. And
we can scarce conclude so of any thing.
Chap. XXIV.
Three instances of reputed impossibilities, which likely are not so, as
(1.) Of the power of imagination. (2.) Secret conveyance. (3.)
Sympathetic cures.
Chap. XXV.
(3.) We cannot know anything in nature without knowing the first
springs of natural motions; and these we are ignorant of. (4.) Causes
are so connected that we cannot know any without knowing all; declared
by instances.
Chap. XXVI.
All our science comes in at our senses. Their infallibility inquired into. The authors design in this last particular.
Chap. XXVII.
Considerations against dogmatizing. (1.) 'Tis the effect of ignorance.
(2.) It inhabits with untamed passions, and an ungoverned spirit. (3.)
It is the great disturber of the world. (4.) It is ill manners, and
immodesty. (5.) It holds men captive in error. (6.) It betrays a
narrowness of spirit.
